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Abstract 
Configuring automated recovery in a multilayer virtualized network presents significant architectural issues. The rules that define 
the interworking strategy between recovery mechanisms must be translated into technology-specific provisioning commands sent 
to network devices. This provisioning data is typically fragmented across many computing and networking resources. There is 
also a set of possible device actions that can be performed by a resource, such as forwarding traffic to a protection route, 
discovering a route to send traffic, adjusting security characteristics of a link, and matching sender and receiver characteristics. 
Consequently, multiple information models, each of which is specific to a device type and technology layer must be understood, 
aligned and shared. As a result, an approach is needed to verify and validate that the resulting recovery operations from the 
input provisioning data achieve end-to-end service requirements. 
 
This paper presents an ontological approach to assure the correct coordination of recovery actions using an integrated knowledge 
model of multilayer recovery. With an ontological approach, an assurance case that proves correctness of provisioning and 
resulting network operations can be automated. Such an ontological model identifies the key domain elements and their 
relationships. Associated statements can then be retrieved from a knowledgebase so that the constraints associated with the 
network representation and service requirements can be tested. 
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1. Introduction to Multilayer Network Provisioning 
As networks become virtualized and cloud-aware, it becomes increasingly important to determine whether the 
resilience requirements of users can be met. If the dimensions of the coordination of multilayer recovery can be 
aligned, it may be possible to select a particular solution approach that is optimized for a particular situation. An 
example of matching a solution technique to a resilience requirement is when to use restoration or protection. 
Restoration that efficiently discovers a new route is useful for unknown traffic demands, while protection is useful 
for predictable capacity demands since spare network resources are pre-allocated to working resources. For a 
resilience requirement of 50 ms or less, as an example, protection would be the logical choice [3, 4]. A network 
architecture for multilayer recovery should provide flexible technology choices to implement multilayer recovery 
scenarios (e.g., GMPLS RSVP-TE over DWDM with optical layer signaling or ATM recovery over SONET/SDH 
protection switching). The networking technology continues to evolve and similar functionality that leverages 
existing operations and maintenance techniques is provided by multiple layers. 
Provisioning multiple distributed components to meet end- to-end resilience requirements is a challenging 
problem. As protocol functionality increasingly runs on network device interfaces, a framework for modeling 
conflicts will become necessary in order to understand what can prevent a network infrastructure service from 
operating correctly at one or more technology-specific layers. To achieve high availability, multiple components 
need to be provisioned so as to manage local behaviors to achieve the desired global behavior. The underlying 
constraints and assumptions that define this global behavior must be specified to prove correctness of recovery. They 
may include providing connectivity or continuity of service and associated temporal deadlines. 
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how assurance-driven design can be applied to verify the correct 
coordination of multilayer recovery that results from device provisioning. A secondary objective is to show how this 
process can be automated. The paper then explores what types of information needs to be gathered, collected and 
transformed to manage available recovery mechanisms that are optimized for specific requirements and situations. 
An example situation is very fast recovery in the sub-50 ms range. A model of coordination is created from 
observing how the network infrastructure behaviors during a failure. This model is then related to provisioning 
commands which are transformed to changes on the model. This paper is organized into two parts: (1) creation of 
the integrated model that includes network infrastructure, service requirements and dependability requirements and 
(2) development of an accompanying assurance case that links service requirements to network infrastructure 
actions. 
2. Integration Requirements for Coordination of Multilayer Recovery 
Coordination of multilayer recovery presents new challenges towards integrating information from different 
recovery perspectives. Among these are business processes, service delivery, security, management and control.  
The knowledge representation of specific device properties, relationships between system elements must be aligned 
so as to achieve end-to-end service requirements. Achieving alignment between such concepts is difficult because 
the interpretation of semantics may differ at different levels within and between components. Also, recovery of 
failed connections has been implemented in technology-dependent ways at different layers. There is no universally 
accepted representation to represent device semantics. Such a representation is a data model with concepts that are 
interpreted and related to other concepts. A key requirement for interoperable systems is openness between 
component interfaces so that the implementation can differ. 
2.1. Information Sharing Requirements for Coordination of Multilayer Recovery 
Establishing interoperability between communication devices and components participating in automated 
recovery requires a shared understanding of the effect of global policy on infrastructure and protocols.  The effect of 
policy on resources defines what happens when an event occurs. Essential information needed to manage the 
coordination of recovery can be exposed to a centralized controller and an inference engine. Effective reasoning 
over network management information depends on the availability of information that is exposed across system 
boundaries. As an example, in multilayer networks based on an overlay model of topologies, the recovery 
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mechanism at the client layer is not aware of the topology of the server layer [1]. However, such information on 
network resources needs to be related and integrated in order to prove that the combined multilayer recovery process 
successfully restores traffic impacted by a failure. 
To achieve “assured reconfiguration” of a protected network service, it is necessary to identify the information 
sharing requirements between applications to be coordinated [2], as depicted in Figure 1. The availability of network 
resources for recovery needs to be known [3]. Signaling, which places resources into service, may communicate 
properties of a fault such as when and where it occurs [4]. The network control plane may need the user’s identity 
and other context data to maintain a certain quality of service [10, 9]. Once the information associated with resources 
in the network infrastructure domain is known, a particular recovery mechanism can then be matched to specific 
service requirements. 
3. Integrated Knowledge Model Applied to the Coordination of Multilayer Recovery 
To verify the correctness of the coordination of multilayer recovery, the different perspectives from which it can 
be addressed should be represented in an integrated knowledge model. This type of approach integrates recovery 
mechanisms through control of the provisioning data that affect how they operate. This integrated knowledge model 
should align architectural concerns and abstract technology-specific implementation details [5]. Sollins [6] argues 
for such a model to be presented in a “knowledge plane”. Two key components of the knowledge plane include an 
“information plane” and a “reasoning framework”1†. To demonstrate that the coordination of multilayer recovery is 
 
 
† 1Sollins [6] defines reasoning as “the capability of reasoning over the information to understand, hypothesize, infer, and act on 
knowledge rather than basic information”. 
Figure 1. Control plane coordination integrates the recovery procedures in two or more layers. 
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correctly provisioned, the knowledge plane needs to access the information available to the devices that implement 
the functionality to be integrated. The information then needs to be organized into an information model. 
Configuration changes which would be realized from provisioning commands can be applied to this information 
model. Then the properties of a service can be related to the properties of available network functionality by 
updating the knowledge layer. 
An integrated knowledge-based architectural model can be used to demonstrate that key relationships between 
configured resources exist after recovery operations are performed. To connect the information to provide 
confidence that recovery operations on the model provide the desired service requirements, the model needs to 
represent the domain area (i.e., recovery theme) associated with the functionality under study, its configuration that 
results from user provisioning, and describe the results of recovery operations if they were performed during a 
failure event. An informative notification of the future state can be delivered to a network administrator. This 
information could be used to provide assurance that coordination of multilayer recovery is correct.  
4. Verifying Correct Coordination 
Assurance cases are usually conceptual and organize argumentation evidence through text-based narratives to     
demonstrate a goal [7]. These narratives can be improved with automated tools. Several studies ( [8], [9]) provide 
examples of system configurations that are verified automatically using a formal representation of the argumentation 
an assurance case. A system configuration, since it encodes knowledge in a machine-processable format, can 
automatically be checked to ensure a system and its components align to a desired requirement. Hall and Rapanotti 
[9] in their paper “Assurance-driven design” apply “problem-oriented-engineering” to build a system solution in 
tandem with an assurance case that ensures it meets defined requirements. Problem-oriented engineering (POE) 
provides a set of transformations of a problem to achieve a solution. The justification at each step helps elicit system 
properties which are realized through component functionality. 
It is beneficial to assess at configuration time whether provisioned resources can be trusted to interact in a way 
that they collectively deliver a provisioned network service. The dependability of the control plane to operate 
correctly can be evaluated using the assurance case mechanism. Norros et al [10] in their paper "A Dependability 
Case Approach to the Assessment of IP Networks" suggest that an assurance-based design methodology using 
dependability cases can examine whether the network delivers a requested service.  The "controllability of 
protocols” is identified in [10] as one of six factors that influence the dependability of a network system. How 
resources are configured affects the controllability of the network protocols that these resources participate in. 
Assuring the correctness reconfiguration depends on a formal structure to demonstrate the selected requirement. 
Processes that develop an assurance case are usually semi-formal and represented using a graphical organization of 
argument components such as claims (i.e., goals) and evidence [11, 12]]. Figure 2 presents an example of goal 
decomposition in an assurance case.  
4.1. Representation of Assurance Case Elements Using an Integrated Ontology 
The structural relationships derived from the results of actions of recovery can be made formal using multiple 
techniques. A key objective of this research is the alignment between service-level requirements, infrastructure 
behavior and provisioning. Consequently, these elements were arranged into an assurance case. The OMG 
Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) was selected to document the assurance case and its elements. 
SACM [13] provides an XML-based metamodel that represents the argumentation-related elements of an assurance 
case.  
Facts about the network represent the network and were documented using OMG Software Assurance Evidence
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Figure 2. Automation of an assurance case that proves service continuity from device provisioning. Service requirements are aligned to network 
infrastructure properties in an integrated ontology. Verification chains statements to demonstrate the overarching goal of service continuity. The 
screenshot depicts the CertWare tool, which chains facts and verify that they are consistent. Facts are expressed using the SACM 1.0 metamodel, 
which is based on XML. 
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 Model (SAEM) [14]. The XML tags for SACM 1.0 models include an argumentElement tag which provides 
an xsi:type attribute, which specifies a specific component of the argument model. Version 1.1 of the two 
specifications and below do not yet provide a mapping from XML to OWL. During this research, we transitioned 
an assurance case that proves service continuity from the D-Case tool [15] to CertWare [16] since CertWare 
provided an implementation of SACM and offered a validity tool that checks an argumentation claim from declared 
evidence [16]. An example verification of the service continuity goal in CertWare is depicted in Figure 2. 
To automate the argumentation process of an assurance case, the elements of the assurance case are mapped to 
ontological categories and their relationships, as depicted in Figure 3. The metamodel that describes the 
components of an assurance case can be implemented by an integrated domain and requirements ontology. In the 
ontological representation of an assurance case, the integrated ontology replaces the claim with a service goal that 
connected to a measurable dependability property such as strong connectivity. The dependability goal is then 
expressed in terms of the evidence, which asserts statements about the subject area that is modeled. The claim   is 
connected to a selected quantitative dependability property, and the system resources and their relationships 
represent the facts or evidence. The argumentation is inferred over declared OWL properties to determine whether 
the assertion of a dependability property in the merged ontology is true. The evidence of an assurance case refers 
to documented facts or assumptions. These facts are typically categorized and linked. As example, the ontology 
development method of [17] creates linkages between a set of systems and system elements and a set of 
trustworthiness properties.  An evidence category either represents a subclaim of the quantitative trustworthiness 
property or a property of some physical component that has to hold collectively along with other properties in 
other physical components [17]. The evidence results from the design decisions that are performed to provide 
service continuity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Representation of SACM Metamodel Elements in an OWL Ontology. OWL provides a data model that supports inference of properties. 
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Once the elements of an assurance case are encoded in an OWL ontology [18, 19], we can then verify 
correctness of provisioning recovery using a SPARQL (Simple Protocol and RDF Query Language) [20] query of 
the inferred data model. An example query that checks mutual reachability of two client site access ports and the 
underlying data is depicted is depicted in Figure 4. Formal logic and reasoning provide a greater degree of trust 
then a simple graphic organization of concepts in an assurance case since a single interpretation of semantics is  
provided through the model axioms. A graphical organizer such as Goal Structuring Notation [21] is a useful aid in 
defining the categories. However, it does not have a rich variety of relationships. Ontologies constrain the ways 
terms such as goals, subgoals and resources in a fact model can be related to each other. They also provide a set of 
operators such as allowing inverse properties, cardinality restrictions and existential qualification of a concept. 
 
5. Summary 
Coordination between recovery processes operating at the same time is needed to ensure correct and consistent 
interworking of the packet transport network with other existing/legacy packet networks [22]  This process needs 
to be planned since interworking between recovery mechanisms may involve contention for the same resources, 
which results from the containment property of layering (e.g., “pipes carried inside of pipes”) [4]. Resources such 
as available links need to be available to carry data for a connection to be restored. 
This paper illustrated how the system assurance process can verify the correct coordination of recovery 
performed by multiple distributed agents in a network. The coordination of multilayer recovery is affected by 
resilience requirements, control plane recovery procedures and how network infrastructure resources are 
provisioned. Validation of recovery methods depends on understanding the information that is shared between 
layers. Verification of a survivability strategy can then be performed by demonstrating that these requirements are 
met by the specific recovery solution. An evaluation of the correctness of the recovery signaling can be performed 
from an inferred model derived from the asserted structural relationships of the network infrastructure ontology. 
Figure 4. SPARQL Query of a Connected relationship between two access-side Ports. The chaining of RDF triples allows overall 
end-to-end connectivity to be verified. An entailed triple a1 <urn:Connected> a2 is present in the inferred ontology generated by an 
OWL Reasoner. 
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With an ontology that represents the facts from selected recovery perspectives, this assurance process can also be 
automated. 
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